General Psychology Walks Again by Engelsted, Niels
General PsychologyWalks Again
Niels Engelsted
Journal für Psychologie, 26(1), 76–96
https://doi.org/10.30820/8247.05
www.journal-fuer-psychologie.de
Zusammenfassung
Allgemeine Psychologie als Wiedergänger
Dieser Artikel hat zwei Teile und erklärt die Rolle,Wichtigkeit und grundsätzlicheOrdnung
der Allgemeinen Psychologie. Der erste Teil wird wie eine Schauergeschichte erzählt; wir
durchqueren die lange Geschichte der Allgemeinen Psychologie und ihre typische Abwesen-
heit, also die Krise der Psychologie. Auf der Basis der Theorien von George Henry Lewes,
Herbert Spencer, Karl Bühler, und Lev Vygotsky und anderen werden Voraussetzungen
genannt, die der Autor für Notwendig für eine Allgemeine Psychologie hält. Aufbauend auf
Aristoteles Taxonomie der Bio-Psychen wird vorgeschlagen, Psychologie in vier Unterkat-
egorien zu unterteilen, die jeweils erklärungsbedürftig sind. In evolutionärer Rangfolge:
Bewusstheit, die das psychologische Präsens bzw. das Jetzt. Intentionalität, die die Zukunft
erschafft. Gedächtnis (mind), das die Vergangenheit erschafft. Menschliches Bewusstsein,
das den Blick von Außen ermöglicht. Intentionalität wird zum zweiten Hauptsatz der Ther-
modynamik in Beziehung gebracht. Gedächtnis wird mit REMS bei Säugetieren verbunden.
Menschliches Bewusstsein wirdmit einem neuenVerständnis dermenschlichen Evolution in
Beziehung gesetzt, in dem alle definitorischen Eigenschaften des Menschen – Gesellschaft,
Bewusstsein und Sprache – zusammengefasst werden.
Schlüsselwörter:AllgemeinePsychologie,Krise der Psychologie, Epistemologie undEpisteme,
Wissenschaft, Intentionalität, Gedächtnis, menschliches Bewusstsein, menschliche Evolu-
tion
Summary
Explaining the role, importance, and basic layout of general psychology, the paper has two
parts. In the first part, told as a ghost story, we visit the long history of general psychology
and its usual absence, aka the crisis of psychology. Drawing on the insights of among others
George Henry Lewes, Herbert Spencer, Karl Bühler, and Lev Vygotsky, a number of require-
ments are listed that the author believes are necessary for a general psychology. In the second
part is sketched the author’s proposal for such a general psychology. Built on Aristotle’s tax-
onomy of bio-psyches, the proposal divides psychology into four subdomains, each in need
of explanation. In evolutionary sequence: Sentience, which posits the psychological present
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moment or now. Intentionality, which posits the future.Mind, which posits the past.Human
consciousness, which posits the view fromwithout. Sentience remains unexplained. Intention-
ality is linked to the second law of thermodynamics. Mind is linked to REMS in mammals.
Human consciousness is linked to a new understanding of human evolution in which all the
defining attributes of the human being – society, consciousness, and language – arrive all at
once and together.
Keywords: general psychology, crisis of psychology, epistemology and epistemics, sentience,
intentionality, mind; human consciousness, human evolution.
I. Graveside Seminar
With this special issue of Journal für Psychologie, a ghost of ages past – general psychology
– walks again. Why general psychology? Whatever else it may be, general psychology
is also a statement; in fact, it could be called the declaration of independence of psy-
chology. The adoption of Galilean methodology may make you scientific, but it is not
enough to make you an independent and rightful science in the family of sciences; you
must stake out a territory and claim it as your own. A special science is defined by its
special subject matter, a domain of its ownwithin the compass of the sciences, with laws
of its own, requiring methods of its own. A special science should be able to outline
this domain; or, at the very least, tell what it is about. In psychology, this mapping task
is assigned to the special field of general psychology. Alas, today that field is merely a
phantom.Without a unifying map, psychology is left with a questionable scientific sta-
tus, undefined, disjointed, amélange of seemingly unrelated disciplines. Psychology can
do better. The attempt to resurrect the old ghost should therefore be much welcomed.
If we wish an evening of spirited and illuminating conversation with that long-
awaited specter, Highgate Cemetery in London will not be the worst place to have it.
Here lie, within a fewmeters of each other, GeorgeHenry Lewes, (next to his common-
law wife, Mary Ann Evans, also known as the famed author George Eliot), the once cel-
ebrated philosopher Herbert Spencer, and, just across the aisle under an Easter Island-
like bust, famous Karl Marx. Could we also, just for the occasion, conjure up the natu-
ralist Alfred Russel Wallace and the American psychologist and philosopher William
James – both being eager contributors to the London Society for Psychical Research,
we just might – the seance on general psychology would be nearly perfect. Only old
Aristotle would be missed. After being force-fed with spiritual ideas by his teacher Pla-
to, the Greek master reverted to his father’s trade and became a firm and dedicated
naturalist and would surely decline such a spooky invitation; but we can always speak
for him.
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Of the people mentioned, there is a good chance you don’t know whoWallace was,
and an almost certainty that you never heard of Lewes. Both lacunae are telling. In
Wallace’s case, being unknown is his punishment for having independently discovered
evolution by natural selection and nearly scooped Charles Darwin. In Lewes’ case, it is
the story of the right idea arriving at the wrong time and place.
General psychology and the crisis of psychology
The right idea was the formula for a general psychology with which Lewes opened
his work, The Study of Psychology, Its object, scope, and method. »The constitution of a
science means,« he wrote, »first that circumscription of a class of phenomena which,
while marking its relations to other classes, assigns it a distinctive position in the series
of the sciences.«Having ringed in the field and related it to the neighbors in the family
of sciences, Lewes explains how you must next specify the special object that defines
and mandates your special science and add the special methods of search this object
requires.
Fig. 1: Lewes’ wheel
Thus, constituted with a rim and a hub, and the interconnecting spokes of multiple
disciplines – let’s call it the Lewes-wheel – a science can begin to roll; »the discovery of
today enlarges without overturning the conceptions of yesterday,« Lewes writes, »each
worker brings his labors as a contribution to a common fund, not an anarchical dis-
placement of the labors of predecessors.«
Lewes names several sciences which had reached this wheel stage, astronomy, and
biology, for instance, then adds that regretfully it »cannot be said of psychology«
(Lewes, 1879, p. 4–5). Here there was no common fund, only anarchical displacement.
Lewes wrote this in 1879, the famous year in the annals of psychology when Wilhelm
Wundt is said to have founded scientific psychology by opening his Psycho-physical
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Laboratory in Leipzig. But though this event marked psychology’s much needed exo-
dus from philosophy and philosophy departments, it did not end the crisis of psychology,
as the malaise was soon to be named; rather it exacerbated it. As James confided to
his students: »It is no science, it is only the hope of a science« (James, 1892, p. 435).
Psychology was not in want of spokes, of course; then as now, the science contained
many important fields, but lacking a defining rim and an organizing hub, the spokes –
when not beating up each other like in a drum sticks tattoo – went each their own way
in mutual disregard.
Though no longer by Lewes, who had died on the eve of his book’s publication,
serious attempts were subsequently made to address the problem. Latest in 1927, when
two important texts were published with ›crisis of psychology‹ in the title. One was
Lev Vygotsky’sThe Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology. Like Lewes, Vygotsky
insisted on the necessity of a defining hub; or a ›cell‹, as he called it, after the vital hub
in biology. »Anyone who could discover what a psychological cell is,« he wrote in his
notebook, »would thereby find the key to psychology as a whole« (Vygotsky, 1978,
p. 8). The other was Karl Bühler’sDie Krise der Psychologie, in which Bühler promoted
an ecumenical rule that should be mandatory in general psychology. In our metaphor,
Bühler basically said that every spoke brings something to the wheel, no spokes should
therefore be left out, but all assigned their rightful and important place in the whole.
So very close they were, but hardly had their ideas been presented before the world
fell apart. Economic depression spread globally from the 1929Wall Street crash, and in
the wake of rising social suffering, Nazism descended over Germany, forcing the leading
lights of German psychology into exile. When war and bloodshed ended, the epicenter
of psychology had shifted from Germany to America; from psychology’s Athens to its
Rome, as the saying went, and what occupied the Romans were practical matters, not
the theoretical concerns of the Athenians. This bias, unknown to physicists, is still with
us.
Brave synthesizing attemptswere still beingmade – among themajor,WilliamStern
(1938), Sergei Rubinstein (1959), and Klaus Holzkamp (1983) – but these were the
exceptions.When general psychology was acknowledged at all, it was only in name, and
only as a catalogue of spokes, like the content list of the standard beginner’s textbook,
no hub, no rim, no wheel. Did students find their curriculum piecemeal and incoher-
ent, deep meta-philosophical explanations were offered, or, they were simply told that
psychology was primarily a toolkit. And – as if by general agreement – the crisis of psy-
chology was never mentioned again.
When the centennial for Wundt’s laboratory called for a progress report this vow
of silence had to be suspended, however, and forth it gushed. »A winter of discon-
tent,« was how Jerome S. Bruner characterized the state of psychology in his Herbert
Spencer Lecture (Bruner, 1976), later explaining that »psychology, the science of mind
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asWilliam James once called it, has become fragmented as never before in its history. It
has lost its center and risks losing the cohesion needed… to justify a division of labor be-
tween its parts« (Bruner, 1990, p. ix). »The whole exercise has fragmented into many
sub-disciplines that have nothing to say to one another,«DavidCohen agreed (Cohen,
1995, p. 237). »Ambiguous at best and chaotic at worst,« said Amedeo Giorgi (Gior-
gi, 1992, p. 46). »An intellectual zoo,« George A. Miller added (Miller, 1992, p. 40).
Yes, the whole »enterprise shows a disturbing absence of that cumulative character that
is so impressive in disciplines like astronomy, molecular biology, and genetics,« Paul
Meehl lamented (Meehl, 1991, p. 3). Right, said Sigmund Koch and David Leary, who
had been commissioned to edit APA’s big centennial report, »after a hundred years of
ebullient growth, psychology has achieved a condition at once so fractionated and so
ramified as to preclude any two persons agreeing as to its ›architecture‹« (Koch &
Leary, 1992, p. 2). »It seems to me,« Zeno Pylyshyn pondered, »that at least part of
the reason that psychology is hard is that we don’t have a good idea of what it’s about
– what it’s a science of« (Pylyshyn, 1987, p. 97). It may not be about anything, Koch
and Leary sighed, wittily comparing psychology to »a jumbled ›hidden-figure‹ puzzle
that contains no figure« (op.cit.).
With no hub, no wheel, no rolling cumulation, psychology became a walking dead
in the eyes of the neighbors, on one side the culture-and-language crowd, on the other
the brain-people, each gang eager to divide up and take over the territory. »Psychology
itself is dead,« declared Michael Gazzaniga, speaking for both, and sending a shiver
through the graveyard. Then the famous neuroscientist smugly added, »the odd thing
is that everyone, but its practitioners knows about the death of psychology« (Gazzani-
ga, 1998, p. xi–xii).
Fake news, it is, of course, the death of psychology, but also a call for us to resur-
rect the quest for a general psychology, which, by outlining the basic architecture – the
Lewes-wheel – of our rich and complex science, can offer something more than just
silence to the crisis of psychology. In other words, it’s time to renew James’ hope and
stop the whimper. »It is never too late to be what youmight have been,« as Lewes’ wife
famously says on a fridge magnet of mine.
Correction
While it is hard to deny that psychology still resembles a brokenmirror, it is not actually
true that psychology has been without cumulation. On the contrary, if we take the long
view, and general psychology should, no science has probably been more cumulative
than psychology. From ancient times to the present day, the field has been a winding
road of points of view, each addressing the previous one, often confrontational, but also
adding to and enriching the ongoing conversation.
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Neither is it true that psychology has been in want of hubs. On the contrary, the
historical record shows an abundance of proposed hubs – from the anima of ances-
tral shamans and the soul of Plato to the psyche of Aristotle and the intentionality of
Brentano; from the reflex of Descartes and Sechenov to the behavior of Watson; from
the subjective experience of Locke and Wundt to the mind of Hume and the streaming
consciousness of James; from the stimulus-response of Pavlov to the activity of Leon-
tiev and the word-informed activity of Vygotsky; from the existence of Kierkegaard and
Jaspers to the meaning of Frankl and the person of Stern – all with a valid claim to im-
portance. If – following Bühler’s rule – all should be recognized, and none left out, the
only question remains which one should be made the foundation stone of the building,
Vygotsky’s key to the whole psychology?
Returning to our Highgate seminar, what did Lewes think?
Acting and knowing
»We live, feed, and move. We, feel, think, and will,« Lewes writes; and, as »the only
agent known is the organism,« »psychology is a branch of the general science of life«
(Lewes, 1879, p. 9–11). This seems like vintage Aristotle; the Greek master had found-
ed the world’s first naturalist psychology precisely as a biology, based on the functions
and faculties of the living agent, moving, feeding, sensing, and – eventually – thinking.
Relative to Aristotle, Lewes made two provisos, however. »Psychology is somewhat
less, and somewhat more, than the subjective theory of the organism,« he writes (ibid.,
p. 25).
Aristotle had made no clear demarcation between the psychological and the bod-
ily functions, naming them all psyche, defined as the agent’s striving toward a preset
goal. When, however, in the subsequent conversation, Galileo showed that striving was
not how physical phenomena worked, the soul-body distinction was forced, and the
psycho-physical problem born. An example of progressive cumulation, but also a call
for a more stringent demarcation of psychology. We therefore, Lewes writes, »need to
specify the difference which leads us to mark off Psychology as a branch of the general
science of life« (ibid., p. 9). Psychology can only be a subdomain of biology.
Aristotle’s had been a psychology of acting, but after Galileo, beginning with
Descartes and Locke, it became a psychology of knowing. Following this tradition,
Lewes marks off psychology as »the science of sentience«; concerned »solely with the
sentient functions and faculties of the organism« (ibid.). This is good, but only if we
don’t forget acting. Splitting off knowing from acting will destroy any general psychol-
ogy. Psychology must be like tennis, the player not only receiving, but also serving. As
famously argued by John Dewey, in the reflex arc the efferent and afferent becomes en-
twined like a Möbius band, and this goes for the molar subject-object activity as well;
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mind and behavior, the cognitive and the conative, are basically an inseparable set. If
this makes action a species of sentience (or sentience a species of action), a single term
to cover both meanings would be welcome.
The psychologist and Aristotle-scholar Franz Brentano (1874) found it in the term
›intentionality‹, which aptly has been paraphrased as ›aboutness‹. Every psychological
phenomenon is about something, every subject posits an object, he said in his famous
definition, and thus made the circle back to Aristotle’s purposive agent. So didWilliam
James in his well-known definition: »The pursuance of future ends and the choice of
means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality
in a phenomenon« (James, 1890, p. 8). As it can be said to catch bothmeanings, acting
and knowing, let’s call it James’ composite.
Epistemology vs epistemics
The reason Lewes opts for ›sentience‹ rather than the traditional ›consciousness‹ –
the favorite of James and everybody else – is worth noticing. Consciousness, he ex-
plains, is tied in with too many special connotations and he needs a more general
generic term. In general psychology, the choice of the generic term is of the utmost
importance.
In my own work, where ›sentience‹, ›intentionality‹, ›mind‹, and ›human con-
sciousness‹ have each been given a specific and different meaning, I had to continue
Lewes’ search for an inclusive generic term. In the end, I opted for psychology as ›the
science of epistemics‹, defining ›epistemics‹ as »the ways the world can be known to
beings to which the world can be known, known in the widest possible sense, conatively
as well as cognitively« (Engelsted, 2017). Awkward and unfamiliar, the term is at least
connotation-free; further, it enables a much-needed distinction between psychology
and philosophy.
In philosophy, epistemology is the jewel in the crown. It is traditionally defined as
the investigation of the nature and possibility of knowledge, which explains why psy-
chology for ages was classed as a minor field of philosophy and taught by philosophers.
The content being the same, i.e., knowing, it was difference inmethod that in the 1870’s
finally enabled psychology to exit philosophy. By leaving the armchair and adopting
measurement and experiment from the inventory of natural science, psychology broke
free from the philosophy departments and declared itself a science. Now a defining
part of psychology’s self-identity, a preoccupation with method has ruled the science
ever since. This is not wrong as such, but that only makes it worse, as the emphasis on
method sidesteps the real issue and hides the true – much subtler and much deeper –
difference between philosophy and psychology. It basically comes down to this. The
nature of knowledge and the possibility of knowledge are two radically different proposi-
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tions. The first takes knowledge as a given, the latter calls its existence into question.
This is the true watershed that separates psychology from philosophy. Philosophy con-
cerns itself with epistemology, the possibility of knowledge; psychology concerns itself
with epistemics, the reality of knowledge and how it comes about.Without this distinc-
tion, a confusion of issues easily creeps into psychology, as the age of postmodernism
bears witness to. Adopting the term epistemics thwarts this confusion.
Two cultures
Lewes’ second proviso makes psychology more than biology. »Our science must seek
its data not only in biology but in sociology; not only in the animal functions of the
organism, but in the faculties developed under social developments«, he writes (Lewes,
1879, p. 51). »It is therefore to History and the observation of man in social relations
that we must look« (ibid., p. 61).
This may, strictly speaking, reflect a bias, still dominant among psychologists, to
sloppily equate biology with its subdomain physiology. If biology is the general science
of life, obviously, human society and history must be included. Aristotle got that right,
defining us as a zoön politikon, a societal animal; but since he is not present to protest,
let’s not be nitpicking; we understand what Lewes means and there are more urgent
issues.
Long before it was codified by Wilhelm Dilthey as Naturwissenschaft, which ex-
plains, and Geisteswissenschaft, which understands, the world of human knowledge had
been divided into fields dealing with physical causes and fields dealing with human
meaning. Though not unreasonable, the divide is quite unforgiving, leading to the two
incompatible cultures famously described by C.P. Snow.While this sits well with most,
for instance the culture-and-language crowd and the brain-people mentioned above,
it is a real problem for psychology, which has a foot in each camp. Wilhelm Wundt
chose to face that challenge by simply making two different psychologies; first his Phys-
iologische Psychologie based on psycho-physical laboratory experiments, then his multi-
tome Völkerpsychologie based on cultural studies; and this division still basically rules
psychology.
Two psychologies are not one, however. The touchstone of general psychology is
precisely the claim for one psychology, the call for one basic architecture to hold both
physics and intentionality, Galileo and Aristotle, physiology and culture, cause and
meaning. By asking for Biology and History both, Lewes makes that claim.
Biology and History are the cue words for our other participants to come forward.
As an adulated philosopher, a close friend of Lewes, and the lost love of George Eliot,
Herbert Spencer steps first.
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Evolution
General psychology is basically an ordering of the different species of knowing, know-
ing in the widest sense. In botany, chaos and crisis were turned to rapid progress when
people agreed on the taxonomy based on sexual organs Linnaeus was offering, and it
says a lot about the dedication of the 18th century botanists that consensus was achieved
despite the artificial character of Linnaeus’ system. One could hope something similar
would follow if taxonomic agreement was reached in psychology. In psychology, where
ad hoc systems, Wundt’s for instance, have all failed, a similar happy outcome would,
however, be too much to expect unless a natural system was found.
Spencer found the method to that natural system. In 1855, laying down an all-im-
portant instruction for general psychology to follow, hewrote inPrinciples of Psychology:
»Mind can be understood by showing how mind has evolved« (Spencer, 1855/1870,
p. 271). In other words, evolution is the key to the mind’s natural order.
Spencer’s evolutionary book predated, anticipated, and prepared the ground for
Darwin’sTheOrigin of Species. Darwin did not discover evolution. Jean Baptiste Lamar-
ck did. In 1809, the yearDarwinwas born, Lamarck inPhilosophie Zoologique presented
a completely naturalistic, elaborate, and essentially correct theory of life’s evolution,
covering both its first beginning as a physical accident in a chemical soup, and apes
descending from the trees to become human beings. Spencer learned about it from a
critical review written by Charles Lyell, Darwin’s mentor and protector, and became an
evolutionist.
What Darwin discovered was natural selection, the invisible hand, or market mech-
anism, that propels evolution. He got the idea from Thomas Malthus’ 1798 tract On
Population, which claimed that there would always be too little food to feed all, and in
the social struggle some would necessarily have to go down in squalor, disease, and early
death. Reading this in 1838madeDarwin’s theory click. Like the breeder weeds out the
less suited specimens, so does the inevitable competition in nature, he said.
Twenty years later Darwin had not yet made his theory public whenWallace made
exactly the same discovery, and, unknowing of Darwin’s work, asked him of all people
to see it published!
A grave embarrassment was averted only by the adroit intervention of Lyell, who
organized a joint presentation of papers, which Darwin – Lyell breathing down his
neck – speedily followed up with the book that rode him to fame and a burial place in
Westminster Abbey.
The term is of a later date, but Malthus was the originator of the Social Darwinism
that quickly gained the theory of natural selection popularity as it provided a scientific
legitimization of crass social inequality, white supremacy, and colonialism. Spencer read
Malthus and became a rabid Social Darwinist. So did Wallace. Having read Spencer’s
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Social Statics, he wrote: »It is the same great law… in the struggle for life, which leads to
the inevitable extinction of all those low and mentally undeveloped populations with
which the Europeans come in contact« (Wallace, 1864, p. clxiv-clxv). After reading
Darwin, Spencer in Principles of Biology came up with the phrase that came to define
Darwinism, and which, onWallace’s suggestion, Darwin adopted from the fifth edition
ofOrigin as the more accurate: Survival of the fittest.
Impact of Darwinism
»[T]he idea of evolution had been bred in my very bones – as was the case with all my
contemporaries,« wrote the Berlin psychology professor Carl Stumpf (cf. Murchison,
1930, p. 409). Possibly true, it didn’t show up much in the subsequent works of the
psychologists. Except in America.
It was reading Darwin that broughtWilliam James to science. First on a zoological
expedition to South America; and, when that was a grave disappointment, and he was
sent to Europe by his family to recover from depression, to psychology, the new science.
In Germany he visited the Psycho-physical laboratories of Wundt and his compatriots,
and on his return he started a psychology course atHarvard. The textbook he published
for that course in 1890, Principles of Psychology, brims with the spirit of evolution; by
a wide margin, it is still the most fresh and inspired introduction to psychology and
shows what general psychologymight have been. Only this didn’t play out; outmatched
by the »brass-instrument and algebraic-formula psychology« that came to rule the day
and filled James »with horror«, he signed over his chair to a German professor and left
the »measly little science.«
Still, the catwas out of the bag. EdwardB.Thorndike, whose experimental chickens
James had kept in his home when the university balked, and who later won interna-
tional acclaim for his conditioning experiments with escaping cats, was only one of
many students inspired by James. With Spencer as America’s First Philosopher, and
Survival of the fittest its prime ideology, evolution became a leitmotif in American
psychology.
Forth and back
Survival of the fittest is a one-size-fits-all formula and leads to a one-size-fits-all under-
standing of life. That is, an emphasis on the basic uniformity and continuity of all
lifeforms. Besides Malthus, this notion – adopted from Lyell’s geological Uniformi-
tarism – had been the axiomatic key to Darwin’s discovery, (Wallace’s too), andDarwin
subsequently devotedTheDescent ofMan, 1872, to demonstrate that every human trait
was to be found among the animals too, if to a lesser degree. The idea opened a whole
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new front in psychology, as it meant that the study of animals offered a completely
new path to the understanding of the human being. Darwin-inspired John B. Watson
grabbed it with both hands; in his 1913 Manifesto of Behaviorism he wrote: »The
behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no di-
viding line between man and brute« (Watson, 1913).
Darwin’s and Watson’s ›no dividing line‹ is the first of two crucial steps. For the
second, we return to Wallace, who suddenly remembered. As a professional collector
of birds, butterflies, and beetles, he had spent long periods living with the South Amer-
ican Indians, and he now recalled that they had been equal to the white man in every
capacity, and not, as Social Darwinism claimed, a breed belonging to a lower rung on
the evolutionary ladder. Rather than the gradual ascent from the ape to the savage to
the British gentleman at the summit, as had now become the accepted view, there was
a leap landing all humans on the far side of a man-brute divide. I defy you to upset
your own doctrine, Darwin wrote in despair; and it didn’t help that his two closest
allies, Charles Lyell and Thomas Huxley, sided with Wallace. Wallace sums up the
controversy:
»On this great problem the belief and teaching of Darwin was, that man’s whole nature –
physical, mental, intellectual, andmoral – was developed from the lower animals bymeans
of the same laws of variation and survival; and, as a consequence of this belief, that there
was no difference in kind betweenman’s nature and animal nature, but only one of degree.
My view, on the other hand, was and is, that there is a difference in kind« (Wallace, 1905,
vol. 2, p. 17.).
Who was right? Bühler’s rule applies here: they were both right. It is equally true that
humans and animals are the same, and that they are not. The task is to show how this is
possible.
Now it so happens that this continuity-discontinuity conundrum was addressed by
Aristotle in the world’s first general psychology.
His solution was a Russian doll model with psyches nesting inside psyches. All life,
defined by feeding (energy-consumption) and reproduction, was the big matryoshka;
inside which was the smaller doll of animal life, defined by locomotion and percep-
tion; inside which was the still smaller doll of higher animal life (mammals), defined
by dreaming and imagination; inside which was the smallest doll, the human being,
defined by societal living, language, and human consciousness, or reason. The human
being is unique in the model; but is also a mammal like the other mammals; an animal
like the other animals; and a living being like all the other living beings.
Aristotle had no notion of evolution but applying Spencer’s instruction – showing
howmind has evolved – toAristotle’s taxonomywould surely point the way to a general
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psychology. The doll-model still does not explain, of course, how evolution got from
one doll to the next. A general psychology would want an answer to that, and ideally
one satisfying both same and not, degree and kind, a case of innovative reuse, we could
call it.
The division of labor
The mention of societal living calls forth Karl Marx. At this very spot at Highgate,
his lifelong friend and comrade-in-arms, Friedrich Engels, summed up his contribu-
tion, saying, »just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so
Marx discovered the law of development of human history« (Engels, 1883). It is a fair
comparison. In his 1927 book on the crisis of psychology, Vygotsky wrote that »the
creation of a general psychology would be the only justifiable application ofMarxism to
psychology« (Vygotsky,1927, p. 330). If we want to place history, society, and human
consciousness on our general psychology map, bringing in Marx is certainly justified;
there has been little else progress to show in these matters.
Marx’s important achievement was to add a second division of labor to the first fa-
mously expounded byAdam Smith in his seminal 1776Wealth of Nations. The first was
the old story of humans taking up tools and working, then specializing into trades –
the baker did this, the tailor did that – followed by barter and exchange, in the process
creating the human society as a trading platform and marketplace. Smith’s point was
Fig. 2: Aristotle’s Russian doll
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that with division and specialization productivity rose and with it the national wealth.
Marx didn’t disagree, of course, but pointed to another and more primary source of
wealth, namely labor’s ability to produce a surplus; that is, the capability of the worker’s
production to exceed his consumption. Capitalism with its division of labor between
workers producing the surplus, and capitalists investing this profit in further cycles of
growth, was the perfect example, but Marx recognized the same principle of surplus la-
bor generated wealth in the previous historical feudal and slave-owning societies, which
defined the human society as a class divided and surplus driven growth engine.
This, of course, is political economy and sociology, the human as a zoön politikon,
Aristotle’s societal animal. How it also became psychology, the human as a zoön logon
echon, Aristotle’s animal with consciousness and language, owes to the wild geniuses
of German Romanticism. J.G. Fichte basically argued that consciousness is awareness
turned inside out, seeing yourself from the outside, alienation; andG.W.F.Hegel subse-
quently saw a prime example of this alienation in labor where the worker is dispossessed
of his product. Like most of his generation, Marx was taken in byHegel’s erudition and
dialectical method, which became the guide for his own economic and political work,
centered on surplus labor. Rejecting the widespread accusation that surplus labor was
theft and should be abolished, Marx identified it as the very basis of human society and
the foundation of human consciousness.
While the suggested psychology of alienation is none too clear, it is highly evocative.
We don’t have many intelligent inroads to human consciousness, but the notion that
consciousness and society holds a deep secret in common is certainly one. Excavation
will be needed, but it seems a fair bet that treasure general psychology can ill afford to
ignore is buried under the Easter Island bust.
Status
What has the graveside seminar brought us? Let’s make a list.
➢ Lewes’ wheel – the general layout or architecture of psychology with rim, hub,
and spokes, aka general psychology
➢ Vygotsky’s cell – the entity or relation that is defining of a scientific domain
➢ Bühler’s advice – the belief that everybody has a valid point, which should be
included
➢ James’ composite – the necessity of bringing together knowing and acting in one
understanding
➢ Lewes’ One-psychology claim – the need for psychology to encompass cause and
meaning both and span the nature-culture divide
➢ Spencer’s instruction – that the evolution and the phylogenetic sequence is the
guide to the mind
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➢ Wallace’s two-step– the recognition that humans are the same as animals, and they
are not, preferably in that order
➢ Innovative reuse – the solution that can explain same and not
➢ Aristotle’s Russian doll – the taxonomic nesting model that identifies four major
subdomains of psychology and accommodates Spencer’s instruction and Wal-
lace’s two-step
➢ Marx’s buried treasure – the deep, but elusive connection between human con-
sciousness and human society
It is my belief that these bullets – if not all, then certainly most – are essential for gen-
eral psychology. At the present time where an agreed-upon general psychology is just a
phantom, possible solutions are at least as important as final solutions. Following Büh-
ler’s advice, many should be welcomed to the table; wise or not, it will take more than
one blind man to get this elephant right. As an example of a possible solution built on
the above bullets, the following is a short sketch ofmy own general psychology proposal
(Engelsted, 2017).
II. A Possible Solution
Built on Aristotle’s nesting model, my general psychology becomes a four-wheel dri-
ve, dividing the domain of psychology into four subdomains in evolutionary sequence.
The subdomains are the four fundamental ways of knowing:
➢ Sentience, common to all living beings, psychologically posits the present moment,
and is the realm ofHeraclitus and Fechner.
➢ Intentionality, common to all animals, psychologically posits the future, and is the
realm of Aristotle and Brentano.
➢ Mind, common to all mammals, psychologically posits the past, and is the realm
of Locke and Freud.
➢ HumanConsciousness, unique to the human being, psychologically posits the view
from without, and is the realm of Fichte andHegel.
As each subdomain constitutes a wheel of its own, it requires an explanation of its own.
Sentience
Sentience is an original feature of the living cell and presumably common to all life.
As the ability to sense change while change is happening, it places the organism in
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a phenomenological real-time bubble, the present moment or now, less than a second
across. The ongoing change – the everything flows-reality of Heraclitus – gives its
bearer an awareness of presence, which, inviting confusion, is sometimes referred to as
consciousness.
When philosophers call sentience the hard problem it is an understatement. Its phe-
nomenological spokes have been well-described and listed as secondary sense qualities,
qualia, raw feel, and the ›what-it-is-like-to-be‹ quality of Thomas Nagel (1974), and
its rim has been quantitatively measured since Fechner, but what its hub is remains a
deep mystery. That it is anchored in the weird nether world of quantum physics seems
a safe guess, though, and eventually we, or the physicists, will get it.
Intentionality
To Aristotle, Brentano, and James, aboutness and purpose define the ideal nature and
essence of the psycho-logic. I think this is right on, but there is this problem. When
Hume correctly argued that time and space intuition could not be derived from the
senses by induction (a posteriori), how to square the ideal and the material became a
problem. Kant’s conclusion that time and space must therefore be a priori forms of in-
tuition, belonging to the mind itself rather than to sensory causation, was not wrong,
but neither was it helpful. It stopped psychology in its tracks for decades until Fechner
showed that at least sensory causation could be measured. Today the problem is largely
ignored, but if we want one psychology, rather than several, there is a possible solution
which both accepts Kant’s a priori idea and, by explaining intentionality as a corollary
to the second law of thermodynamics, ties hardcore ideality with hardcore physics.
Fig. 3: My general psychology in outline
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The second law states that entities more complex than their surroundings must dis-
solve in time (entropy) unless fed with new energy from the outside. The living being
is such a complex entity and must be fed to continue its existence. The smallest natural
unit of life is therefore the organism and its source of energy. Animals, to get to their
necessary food, must move. If they move spontaneously, which they do, and if there is
food to be reached, they will eventually reach it. By operational definition, this makes
the sheer movement goal-oriented and intentional in both meanings: intentionality as
aboutness and intentionality as purpose. The ideal in its first instance is simply a relation
in the world defined – a priori – by the physical setup that makes life possible (Engelst-
ed, 1989).
We shall name the spatial and temporal separation that keeps the agent and object
apart the interspace, and contrast it to the interface, the boundary between organism
and environment across which stimuli and responses are exchanged. An empiricist
legacy, the interface has preoccupied psychology since the 17th century. The inter-
space, however, is essential for psychology to recognize and include. It is traversed in
four distinct stages, the same for all animals from the lowliest amoeba to the human
shopper.
Fig. 4: The four fundamental steps through interspace
First the subject sets out into the blue in search of its object, which takes the form of
goal and hope. Next, with luck, informative traces, chemical, mechanical, or electro-
magnetic, are picked up to guide the subject toward the object, now appearing as signal
and information.When tangible contact is reached, the subject tries to grab and handle
the object, which now shows itself as an intractable thing of its own. Finally, if over-
come, the object is consumed, marking the end and validation of the whole sequence.
Observe that the four stages are recognized in the major historical fields of psychology:
Existential psychology, the searching first; cognitive psychology, the informing second;
behavioral psychology, the handling third; and humanistic psychology, the self-con-
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gratulating fourth. Existential and humanistic psychology are, of course, traditionally
reserved for humans able to talk with themselves, but the hopeful plunge and its sub-
sequent validation resides in the activity itself prior to any conscious reflection and is
shared throughout the animal kingdom.
It is the first stage – the existential plunge, positing the ideal realm of aboutness,
purpose, hope and anxiety – that is the defining hub of the psycho-logic. The existential
plunge has its counterpart in the mathematical Axiom of Choice, which opens for a
new and deeper understanding of both psychology andmathematics, as first ingenious-
ly explored by my colleague and friend Jens Mammen (2017).
Mind
With mind, the psycho-logic – first and always a relation in the world – is duplicated
as an internalized representation. In my native language, which Vikings brought to Eng-
land,mindemeans reminiscence, and this is basically what mind is, John Locke’s white
paper upon which experience is recorded. Hume aptly called it a theater in the head in
which plays can be rehearsed and performed, and the possession of such imagination
– together with the nocturnal dream – was how Aristotle defined the psyche of the
higher animals, here mammals.
If we follow Spencer’s instruction, I believe that precisely the nocturnal dream and
the mammal are keys to how the mind has evolved (Engelsted, 1977).
A twirl on the primordial stimulus-response string – E.C. Tolman’s intervening
variable, black box, and keeper of the cognitive maps of rats and men – is the origin
and hub of the mind. Its first beginning is still around in form of REM-Sleep. Shared
by all mammals and enabling them to sleep through, REMS is defined by two features.
The vivid and emotional imagery of the dream and the sudden loss of muscle tone (cat-
aplexy) that makes overt activity impossible. They are also found in narcolepsy, which
is basically a REMS episode elicited in the wake state by strong emotional stimuli.
It is from this simple mechanismwhere the response is blocked but not the impulse,
which careens through neural centers, evoking imagery, that I suggest mind evolved as
a brief ›thinking pause‹ inserted between stimulus and response.
With olfaction being the chief sense modality of the mammal’s little Cretaceous
night-living ancestor, it developed as olfactory centers expanded into the limbic system,
which became a storage of images and reminiscences, and is an example of innovative
reuse. Chemistry-based olfaction cannot by itself form images, but it can borrow and tag
images from the wave-based modalities vision and audition; the uncanny ability smells
have to conjure up images of past situations in vivid and emotional detail is known to
most. As the present came into being with sentience, and the future with intentionality,
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this is, in fact, how the past came into being as a psychological concept. The impulse
circling the limbic carousel, consulting past experience before again released in a now
more considered response, created the mind, and mind made the mammal the smartest
animal around.
Mother grounds life-world
REMS is not the only defining feature of themammal, however. Co-evolvingwithmind
is the unique characteristic that has given the mammal its name. Feeding cannot indef-
initely fend off the fate prescribed by the second law of thermodynamics. Even before
death by aging was introduced in early evolution, if accident or disease didn’t kill you,
a predator eventually would. For life to continue, reproduction – making copies while
still time – therefore became as important as feeding. There are two different strategies
of reproduction; at the lower end of evolution, a quantitative, emphasizing bulk and
chance; at the upper end, a qualitative, emphasizing small outputs and selective care.
Fig. 5: The evolution of mind andmammal
Themenschwerpunkt: Allgemeine Psychologie revisited | General Psychology revisited
18 Journal für Psychologie, 26(1)
The mammal, feeding the young from its own body, marks a leap in this progressive
evolution.
As its food, and its means to attain it, defines an animal’s interspace, and as the first
instance grounds the animal’s life-world, with the mammal, mother becomes ground.
With mother as simultaneously best friend, prey, and meal, and nursing and care co-
evolving with the mammalian mind with its blocked responses, impulse-diversions,
dreams, and imageries, the mammals entered the inherently social and dynamic (twist-
ed) life-worlds so vividly chronicled by Melanie Klein and Sigmund Freud. Only they
couldn’t tell about it until the human stage was reached.
Human consciousness
That it was brains and speech in the first place that brought the human society into
existence, and took its time about it, has been the standard story amongmaterialists and
scientists since ancient Greece. Still is today. I believe it is the other way around; that
Aristotle’s societal animal, rather than arriving late, is the key to his animal with reason
and language (Engelsted, 1984). To get to the root of human consciousness, we must
therefore first have a clear notion of what the human society is.
Marx got it right when he took capitalism asmodel and pictured society as a wealth-
producing and wealth-investing social formation based on class-divided surplus-labor;
but, subscribing to the standard story, he only got it halfway right. It somehow seems
wrong to date the beginning of the human society to the arrival of agriculture and class
society 10.000 years ago, when the human being by that time had been around for
perhaps a million years or more. If nothing else, your aesthetic sense demands that the
human being and the human society arrive together. Is that possible to argue? It is; the
gist is this.
The first human investment
Humankind’s first social organization, the hunters and gatherers, with males doing the
hunting and females doing the gathering, is a division of labor. Is it also a division of
labor of the surplus-generating kind? Indeed, it is. Among most non-arctic hunters and
gatherers, plant food makes up the bulk of the diet, and women collect the better part
of the food. Not only do they provide for themselves and their children, they are able
to give to the men too. If humankind started like this, it did not make hunting less
important; on the contrary, it has been highly significant. Besides providing an impor-
tant – and savored – dietary supplement, hunting has performed an important social
role as shared meat and shared experience solidified male alliances and stabilized the
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social order. We can, if we so wish, keep the traditional story of how man the hunter
captained our exodus from the animal world; only it should not obscure the fact that
females provided most of the sustenance and did most of the work.
If the female’s work is surplus labor, going beyond her own reproductive needs, is
it also of the wealth-producing and wealth-investing kind found in the later historical
societies? Arguably, it is. For obvious reasons, migrating hunters and gatherers want no
more material property than they can carry. All wealth is not material, however, nor is
all capital. The surplus produced by the women was first and foremost invested in and
accumulated as human capital, and I suggest that the very first investment made was in
male hunting!
Hunting must have been a near impossible trade to take up for the little humanoid;
clever, super-strong, and ferocious, the meat-loving chimpanzee still only manages to
bring in 2 percent meat in its diet. With the women’s surplus as seed money, and with
their continuous back-up, the pioneering entrepreneurs had a chance, however, and in
time the human males developed sufficient skills and experience to become big game
hunters. This means that with the sexes as proto-classes, the hunters and gatherers fully
fulfil the definition of the human society as a wealth-producing and wealth-investing,
class-divided social formation based on surplus labor. Making a lot of sense, congruent
with known facts, and as good an explanation as any around, the proposition should be
uncontroversial. Let’s now proceed to the wild stuff.
The Fall
Once the pivotal role of the females is recognized, another obvious observation follows.
Surplus labor is not something extraordinary arriving with the human being; on the
contrary, it has been around forever! Reproduction – giving birth, nursing, feeding,
and taking care of the young – is surplus labor, if any is, and frommammals, it takes up
a large part of the females’ hours. If, however, human surplus labor is both the same as
the old reproductive surplus labor, and not, a case of innovative reuse, in other words,
what was the innovation?
Since one reproductive cycle must end for a new to begin, mothering – as a law of
nature – has an expiry date. Whether it takes weeks or years, when the young can fend
for themselves, and latest at the onset of sexual maturity, they lose their status as legiti-
mate receivers of motherly care and are turned away. This strict limit to female surplus
labor is transgressed when females start to supply prospective male hunters. The breach
of a natural law is the innovation.
There is a first of everything; if we try to imagine how the transgression first hap-
pened, with wonderful irony we end up with a paraphrase of the old story of the Fall of
AdamandEve, where Eve givesAdam forbidden fruit, whereupon their eyes are opened,
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and they are cast into the human existence and a life of labor. Leaving here aside the
cascade of prehistoric steps, which logically followed (Engelsted, 2017, pp. 95–111),
the psychological important thing is the opening of the eyes, the god’s-eye-view that is
the defining mark of the human consciousness.
Fig. 6: Secret of human being
Confronted by the needy supplicant, whose call says he is a child, and manly attributes
says he is not, the females were in a fix. The future existence of the human being hanging
on a solution to the contradiction, I suggest the females ripped a page fromHegel, and
– with the humorous giggle evoked by children’s riddles – solved the problem by seeing
him as a negation of the negation, a non-non-child!
The two negatives do not cancel out each other; the non-non-insert marks a new
stage where things are seen simultaneously from two contrary positions; turned inside
out, as it were. This view from without – the god’s-eye-view and Hegel’s alienation – is
the opening of the eyes and the key to the human consciousness and language.
Following the non-non-child, the objectifying estrangement spreads. The food be-
comes non-non-food; not only the thing of your desire, but also an objective thing with
properties of its own. The mother becomes a non-non-mother; not only the caring
mama as before, but also a person who can look at herself from the outside – and won-
der. Observe that it is the new objectivity-perspective that brings subjectivity into the
world. In animals, the subjective and the objective are indissolubly meshed; in humans,
the sides can come apart, and each be recognized for what it is; objectivity and subjec-
tivity are human prerogatives. Finally, the estrangement spreads to the vocal and non-
vocal communication that links together mother and young; as the signal becomes a
non-non-signal, at the same time bound to the situation and going beyond, the sign is
born. It sounds the same, but a rift has occurred and with it the new realm of language
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is opened. This is only the beginning, of course, but the decisive step has been made
to give both the humans and natural selection something to work on; language now
being the template introducing human consciousness to young children, brain-wise pre-
pared for it by natural selection, as famously described by Vygotsky. And observe, in
this account, human society – the labor surplus thing – and human consciousness and
language arrive together as an interconnected set.
The human world of mind-products
The psycho-logic is first (and always) a relation in the world. Secondary, it is an inter-
nalized representation in the mind of the relation in the world. With the objectifying
properties of the human consciousness, the mind’s internalized representation can be
re-externalized. As the world was brought into the mind, mind is now brought back
into the world as mind-products, the plethora of external human products carrying
meaning and purpose from tools and garments to laws and institutions. Today the hu-
man world is so replete with mind-products that it can rightfully be called a mindscape.
Language was the first mind-product, bringing the psychologic from the mind back
into the world in form of songs, tales, and narratives about the psycho-logic. With its
proposal that the psycho-logic is parsed into four subdomains, sentience, intentionality,
mind, and human consciousness, this general psychology paper is just another example.
Hopefully it is also proof that general psychology is a worthwhile pursuit. So, join the
invitation to walk with the ghost; the domain of psychology, intricate and intriguing,
should not remain uncharted and unclaimed.
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